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a renewable portfolio system (RPS) is introduced in conjunction with 
environmental regulation.  An ETS with free allocation leads to 
greater renewable energy R&D incentives compared with a CAC or an 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2012, Korea introduced an obligatory national environmental 
regulation, the greenhouse gas target management system (GHG-TMS), as an 
emission reduction measure.  The GHG-TMS is a command-and-control 
(CAC) policy that establishes GHG reduction targets for designated parties, 
which is also known as an emission standard in other countries.  The GHG-
TMS was transformed into an emission trading scheme (ETS) on January 1, 
2015.  In the ETS with free allocation (ETS-FA), 100% of the initial 
allocation is distributed free of charge, whereas in the ETS with auctioning 
(ETS-AU), permits are auctioned; thus, there is no initial free allocation of 
permits. 
One of the key characteristics of the regulation is that it is implemented in 
conjunction with Korea’s Renewable Portfolio System (RPS).  The RPS is a 
renewable energy policy in which the government requires designated parties 
(utility firms in many countries) to generate minimum amounts of electricity 
from renewable sources.  In many countries, an RPS or Feed-In-Tariff (FIT) 
is implemented in conjunction with an environmental regulation such as a 
carbon tax or an ETS.  Renewable energy policies had been in place long 
before environmental regulations such as a TMS, a carbon tax, or an ETS 
were first introduced in the mid-2000s.  R&D investments in new 
technologies will make it economically efficient to achieve established 
reduction targets.  In this respect, governments are concerned with the 
degree to which they encourage long-term investments in product and 
process innovation or energy-efficiency-enhancing technologies and in 
renewable energy utilization.  However, a few studies emphasize that the 
effect of environmental regulations on abatement technology investments is 
positive but limited (Leiter, Parolini, and Winner, 2011).  
Energy and environmental regulations affect R&D incentives for 
developing emission reduction technologies and renewable energy 
technologies, but these incentives depend on environmental policy 
instruments and regulatory specifications.  Therefore, it is important to 
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determine whether a CAC or an ETS results in greater R&D incentives for 
emission reductions and renewable energy technologies.  Environmental 
economists typically conclude that market-based policies such as an ETS 
with auctioning lead to greater abatement-related R&D investments than 
emission standards, carbon taxes, or an ETS with free allocation.  In 
previous studies, R&D incentives regarding emission reduction technology 
have been compared across CAC systems, carbon taxes, and ETSs (Milliman 
and Prince, 1989; Downing and White, 1986; Jung et al., 1996).  Milliman 
and Prince (1989) considered company-level R&D incentives, whereas Jung 
et al. (1996) studied incentives at the industry level, and both concluded that 
ETSs with auctioning and carbon taxes induce greater environment-related 
R&D investments than CAC systems in a perfectly competitive market.  
In imperfectly competitive markets, however, Montero (2002a) found that 
emission standards induce greater environment R&D incentives for GHG-
reduction technology using a game theory model.  The key feature of that 
study is that in an imperfectly competitive market, there are an indirect or 
strategic effect of environment-related R&D investment and a direct effect of 
the investment.  The strategic effect can be positive or negative.  It is 
positive if R&D investments are pure, cost-reducing strategic substitutes and 
negative if R&D investments are strategic complements, reducing marginal 
abatement costs and hence increasing a rival’s production level.  Montero 
(2002b) compared environment R&D incentives under both quantity and 
price competitions.  Under quantity competition, emission standards, carbon 
taxes, and ETSs with auctioning generate higher R&D incentives, whereas 
under price competition, carbon taxes and ETSs with auctioning result in 
higher R&D incentives.  In addition to environmental regulations, RPSs 
have been introduced to foster the renewable energy industry in many 
countries.  Jeong (2011a) extended the studies of Montero (2002a, 2002b) 
by comparing R&D incentives across different carbon regulations when an 
RPS and an environmental regulation are simultaneously implemented in an 
oligopoly model.  
However, none of the previous studies consider how different environmental 
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regulations can affect renewable energy R&D incentives.  Many countries 
have focused on the renewable energy industry to enhance energy security 
and environmental integrity, in addition to creating opportunities for 
domestic economic development by strengthening relevant technology.  
Thus, for countries implementing both an RPS and an environmental policy, 
it is important to evaluate how different types of environmental regulations 
affect renewable energy R&D investments and abatement technology R&D 
investments.  In reality, many final goods markets are not perfectly 
competitive markets.  Permit markets can be imperfectly competitive as 
well because the number of major players with significant GHG emission 
levels may be a few and they behave strategically like oligopoly in the permit 
market.  In ETS, the designated parties can achieve GHG emissions targets 
by employing energy-efficient technology, participating permit markets, and 
using offsets and borrowing and saving measures.  Permit markets, offsets, 
borrowing and saving are the carbon-related implementation measures in 
which major firms with significant GHG emission levels can play significant 
roles.  In the industrial organization literature, firms in imperfectly 
competitive markets have different R&D incentives from perfectly 
competitive firms because R&D investments in an imperfectly competitive 
market can act as strategic substitutes or strategic complements.  The typical 
cost-reducing R&D investment acts as strategic substitutes, reducing rival’s 
production level.  Therefore, this paper studies how the environment-policy 
choice among CAC, ETS with auction, and ETS with free allocation affects a 
firm’s renewable energy R&D incentives in oligopoly. 
In the present paper, characterization of the optimal R&D investment 
follows closely the framework put forward by Montero (2002a, 2002b), but 
differs from it in major ways.  As stated previously, Montero (2002a, 
2002b) compared environment R&D incentives under different environment 
regulations in imperfectly competitive markets, and argued that under 
quantity competition, emission standards, carbon taxes, and ETSs with 
auctioning generate higher R&D incentives than ETSs with free allocation.  
In this study, RPS as an energy policy is considered with three different 
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environmental regulations, i.e., the CAC, ETS with free allocation, and ETS 
with auctioning.  We analyze renewable energy R&D incentives in a 
quantity-based Cournot duopoly model; the renewable energy quota under 
the RPS is established as a proportion of total production quantity.  
 
 
2. MODEL 
 
There are two utility firms (F1, F2) competing in a traditional Cournot 
model and subject to an environmental regulation and a renewable energy 
policy, the RPS.  Three types of environmental policies are considered: 
CAC, ETS with free allocation (ETS-FA), and ETS with auctioning (ETS-
AU).  We assume that firms and the government have complete information 
and therefore, correctly anticipate the Nash output/permit equilibrium in 
Cournot competition.  The firms are symmetric in all respects including 
emission standard and permit allocation.  They produce homogeneous 
products with identical marginal production costs and are engaged in the 
same renewable energy R&D investments.  
Firm i has an inverse demand function ( ),P P Q  where P is the price of 
the final goods and Q is the sum of the firms’ products, 
1 2.Q q q    Firms 
may use fossil fuels and renewable energy as intermediate goods but use only 
fossil fuels when the RPS is not adopted because the costs of renewable 
energy are higher than those of fossil fuels.  For simplicity, it is assumed 
that firm i’s marginal cost of production other than the cost of renewable 
energy is zero, and the cost of renewable energy is ( ),i RiG q 1, 2, i   where 
0, 0. i iG G     The renewable energy quota, ,Riq  is set at ,iq  where 
0 1,   a renewable energy portion of total energy determined by the 
government under the RPS.  The parameter   denotes the renewable 
energy target rate for F1 and F2, which is specified in the RPS 
implementation plan published by the government, and is public knowledge. 
Absent any environmental regulation, it is assumed that firm i emits as 
much as its production quantity minus the renewable energy quota, 
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(1 ) .i Ri iq q q     On the other hand, emission level set by firm i is 
defined as 
ie  after emission reduction in the presence of environmental 
regulations.  Hence, firm i must determine levels of emissions, ,ie  given 
the abatement cost, ( )iW r  with 0iW   and 0,iW   where r  denotes the 
emission reductions and can be expressed as (1 ) .i iq e    By investing in 
renewable energy R&D, firm i is able to reduce the cost of renewable energy 
from ( )i iG q  to ( ),i i is G q  where ( )i i is g V  and 0 1.is    The 
function 
ig  declines as the renewable energy R&D investment level, ,iV  
increases, (0) 1, ( ) 0, 0, 0.   i i i ig g g g       The level of emission 
reductions, ,r  declines as   and 
ie  become large.  It is also assumed 
that the marginal renewable energy cost is greater than the marginal 
abatement cost, ,i i is G W   where 0iG   and 0.iW 
1)
  For this reason, 
F1 and F2 would not meet their reduction targets through trading renewable 
energy quotas.  Under an environmental regulation, F1 and F2 can meet the 
reduction targets by directly reducing emissions through adopting low-carbon 
technology or by trading pollution permits.  
iV  is a pure cost-reducing 
investment in renewable energy technology, but it does not reduce the 
marginal abatement cost.  It is also assumed that the emission reduction and 
renewable energy goals are fixed at E  and ,Rq  respectively, under any 
environmental regulatory scheme, where 1 2E e e   and 1 2.R R Rq q q    
Depending on the type of environmental regulations in place, the game has 
two or three stages.  Under the CAC, the renewable energy R&D 
investment level, ,iV  is set in the first stage, and the firms compete on 
quantity in the second stage.  In contrast, the ETS has three stages.  Firms 
determine their renewable energy R&D investments in the first stage; they 
set their emission levels, 
1 2 and ,e e  in the second stage, and the price of a 
permit, ,  is also decided in this stage.  In the third stage, F1 and F2 
compete on quantity.  
                                                          
1) It is generally known that adopting renewable energy, emitting zero emissions, costs more 
than developing abatement technology.  In this respect, firms would meet their established 
reduction targets first by developing abatement technology with low costs and then adopting 
more expensive technology such as renewable energy.  If 1 1 1,s G W   the firms would go 
above the renewable energy quota to meet their reduction targets. 
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Firm i maximizes its profit function, ( ) ,i i i iV zV   where ( )i iV is firm 
i’s profit at a renewable energy R&D level of ,iV  and iz  is the constant 
marginal cost of the renewable energy R&D investment.  The optimum 
value of R&D investment 
iV  must satisfy the condition / ,i i id dV z   
where /i id dV  is the total derivative of ( )i iV  with respect to .iV   
Following Montero (2002a, 2002b), we compare the absolute values of 
/i id ds  of environmental instruments, where / ( / ) ( )i i i i i id dV d ds g V    
iz  to rank renewable energy R&D incentives.  The equation /i id dV   
( / ) ( )i i i i id ds g V z    that the optimal amount of renewable energy R&D 
investment, ,iV  increases as /i id ds  increases.  This is clear from the 
assumption regarding the ig  function, (0) 1,ig   ( ) 0,ig    0,ig   
0.ig   For all ,is  if the absolute value of additional profit ( )id  
obtained from additional cost reduction ( )ids  of policy A is larger than that 
of policy B, then policy A generates greater renewable energy R&D 
incentives than policy B ( / / ).A Bi i i id ds d ds   
We solve the firm’s profit maximization problem by backward induction. 
Under a CAC scheme, the optimal production quantity, 1q  and 2 ,q  is 
determined in the second stage, and then the renewable energy R&D 
investment, 1V  and 2V  is decided in the first stage.  Under an ETS, after 
solving for the optimal quantity of ,iq  the level of emissions, ,ie  and the 
permit price, ,  are decided in the second stage.  The renewable energy 
R&D investment, ,iV  is determined in the first stage. 
 
 
3. OUTCOMES 
 
3.1. RPS and CAC 
 
When an RPS and a CAC are implemented simultaneously, in the second 
stage, F1 solves its maximization problem with respect to q1: 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) ( ),R RP Q q W q q e s G q                 (1) 
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where 1 2Q q q   and 1 1.e e   1e  is the emission standard of F1 under 
the CAC.  2q  denotes F2’s production level.  The optimal emission level 
of F1 is 1,e  the maximum level of emissions that F1 is able to emit under 
the CAC.  Under the RPS, F1 is obligated to supply a quota of renewable 
energy, 1 1,Rq q  which generates no emissions.  By employing 1 1e e  
and 1 1Rq q  in equation (1), the first-order condition of equation (1) can 
be described as 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) 0.P Q P Q q W s G            The term 
1(1 ) ( )W    indicates that with an introduction of CAC marginal production 
costs increase by an amount equal to the marginal abatement cost at 1 1.e e   
The term 1 1( )s G    indicates that with an introduction of renewable energy 
policy, marginal production costs increase by an amount equal to the 
marginal renewable energy cost at 1 1.Rq q  
In the first stage, using the envelope theorem, the derivative of F1’ profit 
function with respect to 1s  at the optimum output level and emission level is 
1 1 1 2 1 1/ ( ) ( / ) ( ).d ds P Q q dq ds G q    
And therefore 
 
1
1 1
1
1 1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
( )
( ( ))
.
((1 ) )(3 2 (1 ) )
d
G q
ds
P q G P P q
W s G P P P q W s G



   

   

            
 (2) 
 
The first component of the right-hand side of equation (2) is the direct 
effect of the renewable energy R&D investment on F1’s profit.  The second 
component of the right-hand side of equation (2) is the indirect (or strategic) 
effect of the renewable energy R&D investment on the final goods market.  
Assuming that 0,iP P q    the value of 2 1/dq ds  is positive, indicating 
that renewable energy R&D investments are a strategic substitute.  The 
interaction in the duopoly output market results in a positive strategic effect 
from reducing a rival’s output.  The reason is that renewable energy R&D 
investments made by F1 generate lower marginal renewable energy costs of 
F1, thereby increasing F2’s relative costs and reducing F2’s output level.  
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The sum of the direct and strategic effects of renewable R&D investments in 
equation (2) is positive; thus, the overall effect of R&D investments in an 
oligopoly market is greater than in a perfectly competitive market, where the 
strategic effects of R&D investments do not play a role. 
 
3.2. RPS and ETS with Free Allocation 
 
Now, we consider the case where both an RPS and an ETS with free 
allocation are introduced simultaneously.  While firms under CAC are 
obligated to meet their emission standards 1 1 2 2( ,  ),e e e e   where 
1 2 ,e e E   only by reducing their emissions, firms under ETS can achieve 
their emission targets in two ways: by reducing their emissions and by 
purchasing permits from the permit market.  Under ETS, the designated 
firms, F1 and F2, decide their renewable energy R&D level ( )iV  in the first 
stage, emission levels in the second stage, and output levels in the third stage.  
In the third stage, F1 solves its maximization problem with respect to q1: 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ((1 ) ) ( ) ( ),P Q q W q e s G q e                 (3) 
 
where 1  represents initial allowances allocated to F1 free of charge and   
is the unit price of permits after the government distributes a total number of 
permit E  free of charge to the designated firms.  1q  is the quota of 
renewable energy, 1,Rq  under the RPS.  F1 has the following first-order 
condition: 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) 0.P Q P Q q W s G            
In the second stage, F1 determines its emission level, 1.e   Given the 
optimal production quantity, 1,q  using the envelope theorem and by 
differentiating 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ((1 ) ) ( ) ( ),P Q q W q e s G q e            
subject to 1 2 ,e e E   with respect to 1,e  the Nash equilibrium in permit 
market is derived from 1 1 1((1 ) ) .W q e       It can be rewritten as 
1 1 1 2 2 2((1 ) ) ((1 ) )W q e W q e         where 1 2 .e e E    While the 
firms anticipate correctly output levels, they trade permit until further trade is 
not mutually beneficial.  This implies that the market clearing price of 
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permits, ,  is the marginal abatement cost ( ).iW    
In the first stage, F1 determines its optimal renewable energy R&D 
investments.  Using the envelope theorem, the derivative of F1’s profit 
function with respect to 1s  at the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium in the 
permits and output markets is: 
 
1 2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
( ) ( ) ( ).
d dq d
G q P Q q e
ds ds ds
 
               (4) 
 
The first component of the right-hand side of equation (4) is the direct 
effect of renewable energy R&D investments, which is positive (as it was in 
the previous case under the CAC).  The second term of the right-hand side 
of equation (4) is an indirect or strategic effect of the renewable energy R&D 
investments on the final goods market, which is positive because renewable 
energy R&D investments are a cost-reducing innovation and thus increase 
the rival’s relative cost, thereby reducing the rival’s production level (see 
Appendix (A2) for the derivation of 2 1/ ).dq ds   Renewable energy R&D 
investments made by F1 reduce the renewable energy cost to 1 1,s G  reducing 
F2’s output level.  Abatement R&D investments, which lead to lower 
marginal abatement costs, entail a lower permit price and hence an increase 
in the rival’s output, 2 1/ 0.dq ds 
2)
  On the other hand, renewable energy 
R&D investments do not provide lower marginal abatement costs, but induce 
lower marginal renewable energy costs and a larger total production quantity 
for the firms.  This creates a greater demand for permits, thereby increasing 
the permit price.  This suggests that renewable energy R&D investments 
                                                          
2) At first glance, it is not intuitive that renewable energy R&D investments made by power 
companies would affect the permit price.  However, note that the focus in this study is on 
the market structure, in particular an imperfectly competitive market in which two firms 
compete on quantity.  It is well known that while the number of power companies is small 
in many countries, they are major players in the permit market because they have significant 
GHG emissions.  For example, as of June 2013, among designated participants in Korea’s 
TMS, emissions from the power generation sector represent 40.3% of the total, and energy 
consumption in the sector is 39.6%, whereas the number of power companies participating 
in Korea’s TMS is only 5.9% (MOSF, 2014).  This justifies the consideration that power 
companies may have market power in the permit market and affect the permit price. 
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under an ETS are a cost-reducing investment, as is the case under the CAC, 
and reduce the rival’s output level further by raising the permit price.  The 
third term on the right-hand side of equation (4) is another indirect or 
strategic effect of the renewable energy R&D investments on the permit 
market, but it is omitted due to the initial free allocation under the ETS with 
free allocation.  Equation (4) can be rewritten as follows:  
 
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
( )
2( ) .
( )(3 2 (1 ) )
P q G P P q W
d
G q
ds s G P P P q W s G




  

     
 
         
  (5) 
 
A comparison of equation (5) and (2) indicates that renewable energy 
R&D incentives under an ETS with free allocation are higher than under a 
CAC.  The explanation is that renewable energy R&D investments are 
strategic substitutes, and as a result, there is a positive strategic effect of 
R&D investments on the final goods market.  In addition to this strategic 
effect, under an ETS with free allocation, F1’s renewable energy R&D 
investments increase the market price of permits and thus further reduce the 
rival’s production level.  In sum, F ’s production quantity is reduced due to 
the renewable energy R&D investments made by F1 in two ways: first, 
through the relatively high production cost, and second, through an increase 
in the permit price. 
 
Proposition 1: Renewable energy R&D incentives under an ETS with free 
allocation are higher than under a CAC when an RPS is introduced 
simultaneously. 
 
Proof: If 1 1/d ds  in equation (2) is subtracted from 1 1/d ds  equation 
(5), this yields 
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1(1 ) / 2( )( (1 ) )P q G W s G P P W s G               
0,  since 0,iG   0,iG   0,iW   0.iW   
 
The strategic effect of renewable energy R&D investments under an ETS 
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with free allocation in an imperfectly competitive market is positive as in the 
case of a CAC because renewable energy R&D investments are independent 
of marginal abatement costs.  The renewable energy R&D investments are a 
strategic substitute, reducing the firm’s marginal renewable energy cost and 
raising its rival’s relative production cost.  
 
3.3. RPS and ETS with Auctioning 
 
Under an ETS with auctioning, there will be zero initial allowances 
allocated free of charge, i.e., 1 0.    F1 maximizes the following profit 
function with respect to q1: 
 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1( ) ((1 ) ) ( ) ( ),P Q q W q e s G q e                 (6) 
 
where   is the unit price of permits, and the initial free allocation 1  is 
zero under an ETS with auctioning.  1q  is the quota of renewable energy, 
1,Rq  under the RPS. 
The first-order conditions of equation (6) with respect to 1q  and 1e  are 
identical to those under an ETS with free allocation.  Given the optimal 
production and emission quantities, 1q  and 1,e  using the envelope 
theorem, the absolute value of 1 1/d ds is as follows:  
 
1 1 1 1
1
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1
2
1 1 1 1
1
( )
2( )
( )(3 2 (1 ) )
(1 )  
 .
2(3 2 (1 ) )
P q G P P q W
d
G q
ds s G P P P q W s G
G W e
P P q W s G




  
 
 

     
 
         
 

      
  (7) 
 
Comparing equation (5) to equation (7), an ETS with free allocation leads 
to higher renewable energy R&D incentives than ETS with auctioning.  The 
direct effect is identical under both regulatory schemes, whereas the strategic 
effects differ between the two schemes.  The second term on the right-hand 
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side of equation (7) is the strategic effect of the R&D investments on the 
final goods market, which is positive because the renewable energy R&D 
investments made by F1 lead to a lower F1’s marginal renewable energy 
cost, increasing its rival’s relative cost and thus reducing the rival’s 
production level.  The ETS generates a greater strategic effect of renewable 
energy R&D investments on the final goods market through the permit 
market than does the CAC.  Unlike an ETS with free allocation, the third 
term on the right-hand side of equation (7) is not zero, representing another 
strategic effect of renewable energy R&D investments on the permit market.  
In fact, the third term is negative because renewable energy R&D 
investments increase the permit price (see Appendix (A3) for the derivation 
of / ).id ds   The explanation is that with a lower marginal renewable 
energy cost, F1 is able to increase its production quantity and hence its 
demand for permits, increasing the market clearing permit price. 
 
Proposition 2: When an RPS is introduced in conjunction with an 
environmental regulation in an imperfectly competitive market, an ETS with 
free allocation induces greater renewable energy R&D incentives than an 
ETS with auctioning. 
 
Proof: It is evident from the comparison of equation (5) and (7).  The 
strategic effect of renewable energy R&D (RE-R&D) investments under an 
ETS with free allocation is greater than that under an ETS with auctioning.  
This is due to the difference of indirect or strategic effects between ETS-FA 
and ETS-AU.  The indirect or strategic effect on the final goods market 
under ETS is positive as mentioned above, increasing cost competitiveness of 
a firm with RE-R&D investments over its rival.  However the indirect or 
strategic effect on the permit market under ETS-AU is negative while the 
effect under ETS-FA is zero.  
 
Renewable energy R&D investments under ETS-AU increase the permit 
price due to output increases with lower production cost of renewable energy. 
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Renewable energy R&D investments act as strategic substitutes in both the 
output and permit markets in the model. 
 
Proposition 3: When an RPS is introduced in conjunction with an 
environmental regulation in an imperfectly competitive market, if the 
amount of emission 1( )e  is less than a certain emission level ( ),M  where 
2
2 2
(3 2 (1 ) )
,
( )( (1 ) )
i i i i i
i i i i i
P q P P q W s G
M
s G P P W s G
 
  
       

       
 an ETS with auctioning induces 
greater renewable energy R&D incentives than a CAC.  Conversely, if 
,iM e  a CAC induces greater renewable energy R&D incentives than an 
ETS with auctioning. 
 
Proof: By subtracting equation (2) from equation (7), it is easily 
determined that 2 2
1( (1 ) ) / (2( )( (1 ) ))i i i i i i iP q G W s G P P W s G                
2( (1 )  ) / (2(3 2 (1 ) )) ,i i i i i i iG W e P P q W s G H               which can be either 
positive or negative depending on the strategic effects of renewable energy 
R&D investments on both final goods and permit markets.  The equation 
H can be simplified as 
2 2
(1 )
 
2 ( )( (1 ) )
i i i
i i i i i
G W P q
s G P P W s G
 
  
  

       
+ 
2
.
3 2 (1 )
i
i i i i
e
P P q W s G 


       
  With simple calculation, we derive that 
0H   if ,iM e where 
2
2 2
(3 2 (1 ) )
.
( )( (1 ) )
i i i i i
i i i i i
P q P P q W s G
M
s G P P W s G
 
  
       

       
 M  
is a threshold emission level at which the net strategic effects of RE-R&D 
investments on both output and permit markets under ETS with auctioning 
are the same as the strategic effect on output market under CAC. 
 
According to Proposition 3, an ETS with auctioning induces greater 
renewable energy R&D investments than a CAC under certain conditions.  
If the strategic effect of output markets under an ETS with auctioning is 
greater than that under a CAC and the difference of the strategic effects of 
output market between an ETS with auctioning and a CAC is greater than the 
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negative strategic effect of permit market under an ETS with auctioning, an 
ETS with auctioning leads to greater renewable energy R&D incentives than 
does a CAC.  Conversely, if the difference is less than the negative strategic 
effect, ,iM e  a CAC leads to greater renewable energy R&D incentives 
than an ETS with auctioning.  
 
 
4. SIMULATIONS 
 
Next, we compare the renewable energy R&D incentives given a specific 
demand function 1 2( ) ( ),P Q a b q q    abatement costs 
2((1 ) ) ,i iq e   
and renewable energy costs 
20.5 ( ) .iq   In this chapter, we omit the 
subscript i for the variables, ,  ,  ,  ,and ,q s g V G  because we only consider a 
symmetric equilibrium.  Renewable energy costs become 
20.5 ( ) ,s q
where ( ),s g V  after renewable energy R&D investments are made.  For 
simplification,
4)
 RE-R&D effects are set at three different values, 0.5,s   
0.75, and 1, and the renewable energy quotas are also set at three different 
values, 0.1,  0.2,  and 0.5.    
Table 1 presents the RE-R&D incentives with a general demand curve, 
1 2( ) ( ),P Q a b q q    where 10a   and 2.b    Total emissions, ,E  are 
capped at 2, which implies that by symmetry each firm is permitted to emit 1 
unit at most under any environmental regulation before RE-R&D.
5)
   In this 
case, an ETS with free allocation leads to greater R&D incentives than a 
CAC or an ETS with auctioning.  Given general elasticity of demand, an 
ETS with auctioning provides greater RE-R&D incentives than does a CAC. 
                                                          
4) Even though RE-R&D level, ,iV  is endogenously determined, we rank RE-R&D 
investment incentives between A policy and B policy by comparing /i id ds  of A policy 
with /i id ds  of B policy.  In order to avoid numerical complications, s is exogenously 
given in simulations. 
5) Total emission E  is 2 in the simulation.  If a different value is given for the total 
emission, the value of direct and strategic effect would not be the same.  However, the size 
of emission cap ( )E  would not affect the RE-R&D rank among environment regulations.  
Equations (2), (5), (7) do not include emission cap ( ).E  
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Table 1 RE-R&D Incentives with General Demand 
Policy s σ e q P(Q) 
Effects 
Direct Strategic Total 
10,  2,  0.1a b     
CAC 1 – 1 1.545  3.822  0.524 0.069 0.592 
ETS-FA 1 1.09  1 1.545  3.822  0.524 0.174 0.698 
ETS-AU 1 1.09  1 1.545  3.822  0.524 0.141 0.665 
CAC 0.75 – 1 1.546  3.818  0.524 0.069 0.593 
ETS-FA 0.75 1.09  1 1.546  3.818  0.524 0.175 0.698 
ETS-AU 0.75 1.09  1 1.546  3.818  0.524 0.142 0.666 
CAC 0.5 – 1 1.547  3.814  0.524 0.069 0.593 
ETS-FA 0.5 1.09  1 1.547  3.814  0.524 0.175 0.699 
ETS-AU 0.5 1.09  1 1.547  3.814  0.524 0.142 0.666 
10,  2,  0.2a b     
CAC 1 – 1 1.576  3.696  0.599 0.161 0.760 
ETS-FA 1 1.15  1 1.576  3.696  0.599 0.343 0.942 
ETS-AU 1 1.15  1 1.576  3.696  0.599 0.288 0.887 
CAC 0.75 – 1 1.580  3.678  0.600 0.163 0.763 
ETS-FA 0.75 1.16  1 1.580  3.678  0.600 0.349 0.949 
ETS-AU 0.75 1.16  1 1.580  3.678  0.600 0.294 0.894 
CAC 0.5 – 1 1.585  3.661  0.600 0.165 0.766 
ETS-FA 0.5 1.17  1 1.585  3.661  0.600 0.355 0.956 
ETS-AU 0.5 1.17  1 1.585  3.661  0.600 0.300 0.900 
10,  2,  0.5a b     
CAC 1 – 1 1.571  3.714  1.117 0.470 1.588 
ETS-FA 1 1.14  1 1.571  3.714  1.117 0.635 1.752 
ETS-AU 1 1.14  1 1.571  3.714  1.117 0.579 1.696 
CAC 0.75 – 1 1.600  3.600  1.140 0.518 1.658 
ETS-FA 0.75 1.20  1 1.600  3.600  1.140 0.706 1.846 
ETS-AU 0.75 1.20  1 1.600  3.600  1.140 0.647 1.787 
CAC 0.5 – 1 1.630  3.481  1.164 0.572 1.736 
ETS-FA 0.5 1.26  1 1.630  3.481  1.164 0.787 1.951 
ETS-AU 0.5 1.26  1 1.630  3.481  1.164 0.727 1.890 
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Table 2  RE-R&D Incentives with Elastic Demand 
Policy s σ e q P(Q) 
Effects 
Direct Strategic Total 
10,  0.05,  0.1a b     
CAC 1 – 8 13.631  8.637  2.358  0.031  2.389  
ETS-FA 1 11.26  8 13.631  8.637  2.358  12.753  15.111  
ETS-AU 1 11.26  8 13.631  8.637  2.358  2.884  5.242  
CAC 0.75 – 8 13.670  8.633  2.369  0.031  2.400  
ETS-FA 0.75 11.34  8 13.670  8.633  2.369  13.850  16.219  
ETS-AU 0.75 11.34  8 13.670  8.633  2.369  3.925  6.294  
CAC 0.5 – 8 13.708  8.629  2.379  0.031  2.410  
ETS-FA 0.5 11.42  8 13.708  8.629  2.379  15.131  17.510  
ETS-AU 0.5 11.42  8 13.708  8.629  2.379  5.150  7.529  
10,  0.05,  0.2a b     
CAC 1 – 8 15.099  8.490  9.620  0.107  9.727  
ETS-FA 1 14.20  8 15.099  8.490  9.620  16.028  25.647  
ETS-AU 1 14.20  8 15.099  8.490  9.620  –4.451  5.168  
CAC 0.75 – 8 15.302  8.470  9.866  0.113  9.979  
ETS-FA 0.75 14.60  8 15.302  8.470  9.866  19.715  29.581  
ETS-AU 0.75 14.60  8 15.302  8.470  9.866  –1.318  8.549  
CAC 0.5 – 8 15.510  8.449  10.123  0.119  10.242  
ETS-FA 0.5 15.02  8 15.510  8.449  10.123  25.093  35.216  
ETS-AU 0.5 15.02  8 15.510  8.449  10.123  3.484  13.607  
10,  0.05,  0.5a b     
CAC 1 – 8 15.652  8.435  61.748  0.507  62.255  
ETS-FA 1 15.30  8 15.652  8.435  61.748  5.810  67.558  
ETS-AU 1 15.30  8 15.652  8.435  61.748  –21.411  40.337  
CAC 0.75 – 8 17.561  8.244  77.597  0.813  78.410  
ETS-FA 0.75 19.12  8 17.561  8.244  77.597  10.619  88.216  
ETS-AU 0.75 19.12  8 17.561  8.244  77.597  –23.647  53.951  
CAC 0.5 – 8 20.000  8.000  100.500  1.389  101.889  
ETS-FA 0.5 24.00  8 20.000  8.000  100.500  22.222  122.722  
ETS-AU 0.5 24.00  8 20.000  8.000  100.500  –22.222  78.278  
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Table 2 reports RE-R&D incentives with an elastic demand curve, 
1 2( ) ( ),P Q a b q q    where 10a   and 0.05,b  in which total 
emissions, ,e  are capped at 16 units, indicating that a maximum of 8 units 
are permitted for each firm.  An ETS with free allocation induces greater 
RE-R&D investments than does a CAC or an ETS with auctioning. Given 
elastic demand, it is inconclusive whether the RE-R&D incentives under an 
ETS with auctioning are greater than they would be under a CAC.  For 
example, a CAC leads to greater RE-R&D incentives than an ETS with 
auctioning at 0.2,  0.5,   whereas an ETS with auctioning induces greater 
RE-R&D incentives at 0.1.    In sum, if the value of the indirect or 
strategic effects of RE-R&D investments is negative, RE-R&D incentive 
under a CAC are always greater than those under an ETS with auctioning.  
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
This paper suggests that when a government determines its national 
implementation scheme for GHG reduction, renewable energy R&D 
incentives should be considered equally with abatement-related R&D 
incentives.  When renewable energy is considered an important tool for 
economic growth and achieving a low-carbon society, environmental policies 
should be evaluated with respect to their effects on renewable energy 
technology development.  In imperfectly competitive markets for final 
goods and permits, an ETS with free allocation leads to greater renewable 
energy R&D incentives than a CAC or an ETS with auctioning.  This is 
because renewable energy R&D investments under an ETS with free 
allocation only induce positive strategic effects from cost-reducing 
innovation, whereas an ETS with auctioning has negative strategic effects 
resulting from an increasing permit price and positive strategic effects 
resulting from cost-reducing innovation.  This result differs from those of 
previous studies.  In studies considering perfectly competitive markets, an 
ETS with auctioning generally induces greater abatement-related R&D 
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incentives than other regulatory instruments.  In imperfectly competitive 
markets, however, emission standards may offer greater environmental R&D 
incentives than an ETS due to the strategic effects of abatement-related R&D 
investments.  The logic is that environmental R&D investments made under an 
ETS induce a negative strategic effect by lowering marginal abatement costs 
and hence increasing the rival’s production level through the permit market. 
Now, let’s consider perfectly competitive markets for emissions and/or 
final goods.  When competitive markets for both final goods and emissions 
and a perfectly competitive market for final goods with an imperfectly 
competitive permit market are assumed, renewable energy R&D incentives 
are identical under all regulatory schemes.  This comes from the fact that 
there is no strategic effect of R&D investments in a competitive market for 
final goods.  However, when an imperfectly competitive market for final 
goods with a perfectly competitive permit market is considered, an ETS with 
free allocation and an ETS with auctioning have identical R&D incentives, 
and ETS lead to greater incentives than under a CAC.  This is because 
renewable energy R&D investment increases a rival’s relative production 
costs and therefore reduces the rival’s output. 
The result of this paper may be affected if abatement-related R&D 
investments are also considered and if the relationship between iV  and ie  
is structured differently.  If ie  is related to iV  in such a way that 
renewable energy R&D investments reduce emissions, the direct effect is the 
sum of ( )iG   and ( ),iW    which is identical for all environmental 
instruments.  However, the strategic effects of renewable energy R&D 
investments differ under each environmental policy, and hence, ranking the 
renewable energy R&D incentives of the various environmental instruments 
depends on the size of the strategic effects.  If ie  is positively related to 
,is  the strategic effects arise from two different channels through the permit 
market, producing negative and positive effects.  The positive strategic 
effect arises from the decrease in the rival’s production level through cost-
reducing innovation that induces lower marginal renewable energy costs and 
a larger total output quantity, creating a greater demand for permits and 
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hence increasing the permit price.  The negative strategic effect is due to 
reduced abatement costs, which reduces the permit price and hence increases 
the rival’s production level.  The overall strategic effects of renewable 
energy R&D investments are inconclusive and depend on the size of the 
strategic effects.  If firms in an oligopoly market make both abatement-
related and renewable energy R&D investments simultaneously, a CAC may 
lead to less, more, or the same level of R&D incentives relative to an ETS 
with free allocation or an ETS with auctioning.  The intuition is that the 
positive strategic effects of renewable energy R&D investments under an 
ETS with free allocation are offset by the negative strategic effects of 
abatement R&D investments.  Thus, the overall strategic effect of both 
R&D investments under an ETS with free allocation may be less than or the 
same as under a CAC or an ETS with auctioning. 
One extension of this study can be found in a model with a green 
certificate market.  Renewable energy R&D investments reduce the price of 
the green certificate and therefore increase the rival’s production level, which 
is a negative strategic effect that is inversely related to the positive strategic 
effect of cost-reducing innovation.  Thus, when comparing environmental 
regulatory instruments in the presence of a green certificate market, the 
relative levels of abatement and renewable energy R&D incentives will 
depend on the overall size of the strategic effects.  
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
A1. RPS and CAC 
 
The first-order conditions of firm 1 and 2, /i id dq  and / ,j jd dq  are 
respectively, 
 
1 1 1 1 1( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) 0,P Q P Q q W s G q                  (A1) 
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2 2 2 2 2( ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) 0.P Q P Q q W s G q                 (A2) 
 
Totally differentiating the equation (A1) and (A2) with respect to 1s  are 
respectively, 
 
1 2 1 1 2
1
1 1 1 1 1
2 1
1 1 1 1
1
((1 ) ) 0,
dq dq dq dq dq
P P P q
ds ds ds ds ds
dq
G W s G
ds
  
   
        
   
      
         (A3) 
 
1 2 2 1 2
2
1 1 1 1 1
2 2
2 2 2
1
((1 ) ) 0.
dq dq dq dq dq
P P P q
ds ds ds ds ds
dq
W s G
ds
 
   
        
   
    
         (A4) 
Subtract equation (A4) from equation (A3), and rearrange equation (A4); 
the following are derived: 
 
2 21 2
1 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 1
( (1 ) ) ( (1 ) ) 0,
dq dq
P W s G G P W s G
ds ds
                   (A5) 
 
21 2
2 2 2 2 2
1 1
( ) (2 (1 ) ) 0.
dq dq
P P q P P q W s G
ds ds
                      (A6) 
 
From equation (A5) and (A6), /j idq ds  is derived as follows: 
 
2 1 1
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
( )
.
((1 ) )(3 2 (1 ) )
dq G P P q
ds W s G P P P q W s G

   
  

            
  (A7) 
 
Assuming that 1 0,P P q    it is clear that 2 1/ 0.dq ds    
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A2. RPS & ETS with Free Allocation 
 
Totally differentiating the first order conditions, /i id dq  and 
/ ,j jd dq  with respect to 1,s  we find:  
 
1 2 1 1 2
1
1 1 1 1 1
21 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
(1 )
                           0,
dq dq dq dq dq
P P P q
ds ds ds ds ds
dq de dq
G W s G
ds ds ds

 
   
        
   
 
       
 
 (A8) 
 
1 2 2 1 2
2
1 1 1 1 1
22 2 2
2 2 2
1 1 1
(1 )
                          0,
dq dq dq dq dq
P P P q
ds ds ds ds ds
dq de dq
W s G
ds ds ds


   
        
   
 
     
       
(A9) 
 
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 1 1 1
(1 ) (1 ) 0,
dq de dq de
W W
ds ds ds ds
 
   
         
   
           (A10) 
 
1 2
1 1
0.
de de
ds ds
                                          (A11) 
 
Subtract equation (A9) from equation (A8) and rearrange equation (A9); 
then,  
 
2 1 1 2
1 1 1 1 1 2
1 1 1
2 2
2 2 2
1
( (1 ) )
      ( (1 ) ) 0,
dq de de
P W s G G W W
ds ds ds
dq
P W s G
ds
  
 
   
             
   
      
         (A12) 
 
21 2 2
2 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1
( ) ( ) (2 (1 ) ) 0.
dq de dq
P P q W P P q W s G
ds ds ds
               (A13) 
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From equation (A10) and (A11), the following are derived:  
 
1 1 2
1 1 1
(1 )
,
2
de dq dq
ds ds ds
  
  
 
               (A14) 
 
2 2 1
1 1 1
(1 )
.
2
de dq dq
ds ds ds
  
  
 
               (A15) 
 
By plugging equation (A14) and (A15) into equation (A12), the following 
are derived: 
 
2 21 2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1
( ) ( ) 0.
dq dq
P s G P s G G
ds ds
                  (A16) 
 
By plugging equation (A16) and (A15) into equation (A13), the following 
are derived: 
 
2 2
2 2 2 2
1
1 2 2
2
1 1
(3 2 (1 ) )
(1 )
( )
2       0,
dq
P P q W s G
ds
G P P q W
P s G
 



 
        
 

    
 
 
               (A17) 
 
1 2 2
2
2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2 2
1
( )
2 .
( )(3 2 (1 ) )
G P P q W
dq
ds s G P P P q W s G


  

    

         
    (A18) 
 
By plugging equation (A18) into equation (8), equation (9) is derived. 
 
A3. RPS & ETS with Auctioning 
 
Totally differentiating equation (6) with respect to 1,s  we find: 
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1 1 2 2
1 2
1 1 1 1 1
(1 ) (1 ) .
dq de dq ded
W W
ds ds ds ds ds

 
   
         
   
    (A19) 
 
Using equation (A19), (A16) and (A18), 1/d ds  is derived as follows: 
 
1 2
2
1 2 2 2 2
(1 )
.
2(3 2 (1 ) )
G Wd
ds P P q W s G
 
 
 

      
        (A20) 
 
Assuming that 0,iP P q    renewable energy R&D investments made 
by firm 1, 1,V  increase the permit price, 1:  / 0.d V     This can be 
rewritten as 1/ 0d ds   because 1V  reduces renewable energy costs to 
1 1s G  but increases the permit price.  By plugging equation (A20) into 
equation (4), equation (7) can be obtained.  
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